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COMENTS
mentioned as the "rule of the Finn case" was wisely limited only to
those situations where the judge was the initial decision-maker.
It is not hard to perceive the awkward and confusing position of
an accused who is first allowed, and then denied, bail because of a
change in judges. The integrity of the judicial system might also be
somewhat impaired when judges of equal rank and each "vested with
sound discretion" are allowed to reverse each other after hearing
essentially the same facts as to probable guilt.
It is not to be denied that an accused who acts in such a manner
as to be a menace to society or who is deemed unlikely to appear for
trial should have his bail revoked and further bail denied. This, however, was not the case in Marcum for there was no indication that the
appellant acted in any way other than that prescribed by law while
awaiting trial.
In conclusion it should be said that the Court in Marcum took
another wise step in securing the freedom of the citizens of the Commonwealth from arbitrary intrusions. Section 16 of the Kentucky
Constitution assures the right to bail. Section 2 likewise declares that
absolute and arbitrary power over the liberty of free men exists nowwhere in a republic, not even the largest majority. The Court has affirmed and applied each of these provisions and has clarified and
secured the position of the individual under them.
Mark Stephen Pitt
CLAusE.-As a result of her diabetic
condition, plaintiffs leg was amputated in 1965. Three years later
upon applying to defendant Rehabilitation Center for instruction in
the use of an artificial limb, plaintiff was accepted as a "candidate"
for rehabilitation. However, as a condition of her acceptance, she, like
all other patients of the Rehabilitation Center, was forced to sign an
exculpatory agreement1 which released the hospital from liability for
its own negligence. 2 After this formality was satisfied, actual therapy
was begun, and during the third treatment her stump was severely
TORTS-NEGLiGENCE-ExcuLPATORY

l'Exculpatory-clearing or tending to clear from alleged fault or guilt;
excusing." Br.LcK's LAw DiCTIONARY 675 (4th ed. 1951). There are three types
of exculpatory clauses. The exemption clause which is found in the present case
provides that the exculpated party is not liable for any clause whatsoever. Second,
there is a release whereby the releasing party waives all claims. Third, the
releasing party covenants not to sue for any claim. Smith, Contractual Controls
of Damages
in Commercial Transactions, 12 HAs=xTcs L.J. 122 (1960).
2
The agreement provided:
I further agree that, I will assume all risks which have been explained to
me in detail that result from diagnosis and treatment. I will not assert any
claim against the Center, its employees, or its volunteers that results
from unintentional acts or conduct on their part.
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fractured by one of the employees of the Center. The injured leg was

later examined by her doctor who diagnosed that the fracture precluded any possibility of future use of an artificial limb. Suit was
then brought against the Rehabilitation Center for negligence. The
Jefferson Circuit Court directed a verdict for the defendant based
on the exculpatory agreement and the plaintiff appealed. 3 Held: Reversed. An exculpatory agreement will not be upheld where either
public interest requires the performance of duties or the parties do
not stand on an equal footing. Meiman v. Rehabilitation Center, Incorporated,444 S.W.2d 81 (Ky. 1969).
In deciding past cases involving exculpatory clauses, 4 the Kentucky
Court of Appeals has in each case used the public interest test.5
Thus, the Court has found liability where a party owing a public
duty has attempted to avoid negligence liability through an exculpatory contract. 6 Conversely, the Court has held that a party may contract against his responsibility if he neither owes a public duty nor
affects the public interest by his actions.7 Hence, a municipality8 has
not been allowed to avoid liability while a landlord 9 has been permitted to exculpate himself freely.
Like Kentucky, all other states except New Hampshire'0 have used
public interest as the determining factor in finding liability. Typically,
public service corporations which supply gas," electricity,12 tele3 The defendant relied upon the exculpatory clause when making the
motion for directed verdict in the trial court; but in its brief filed on appeal, it
placed no reliance on the clause. Rather, the Center contented itself with asserting that there was no proof that it did not meet the standard of care.
4 See Cincinnati N. 0. & T. P. Ry. v. Haneford, 305 Ky. 854, 205 S.W.2d
346 (1947); Gorman Coal Co. v. Louisville & N. R.R., 213 Ky. 551, 281 S.W.
487 (1926).
5 The public interest test provides that if any party is involved in an activity
in which the whole public has a direct and positive interest, it shall not be permitted to contract away its liability. Hamilton, Affection with Public Interest, 39
YALE L.J. 1089 (1930).

6 French v. Gardners' & Farmers' Market Co., 275 Ky. 660, 122 S.W.2d 487
(1938).
7 Greenwich Ins. Co. v. Louisville & N. R.R., 112 Ky. 598, 66 S.W. 411

(1902).
8

Hazard Municipal Housing Comm'n v. Hinch, 411 S.W.2d 686 (Ky.
1967).
9 Cobb v. Gulf Refining Co., 284 Ky. 523, 145 S.W.2d 96 (1941). Federal
Courts in Kentucky have applied this rule more liberally. In Franklin Fire Ins.
Co. v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 140 F.2d 898 (6th Cir. 1945), the court held that
a common carrier may contract against its ordinary negligence when not acting in
its capacity as a common carrier.
0New Hampshire does not use the public interest test but it applies the
restrictions more stringently. It simply does not allow avoidance of liability by
contract at all. See Nashua Gummed & Coated Paper Co. v. Noyes Buick Co.,
93 N.H. 348, 41 A.2d 920 (1945); Papakalos v. Shaka, 91 N.H. 265, 18 A.2d
377 (1941)- Wessman v. Boston & M. R.R., 84 N.H. 265, 152 A. 476 (1930).
11Faiffax Gas & Supply Co. v. Hadary, 151 F.2d 939 (4th Cir. 1945).
2Denver Consol. Elec. Co. v. Lawerence, 31 Colo. 301, 73 P. 39 (1903).
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phones,' 3 and telegraphic services14 have not been permitted to
limit their liability. In addition, irrigation companies' 5 and housing
authorities 16 have also been held to a public duty, while banks' 7 have
been allowed to avoid liability because of their lack of public duty.
From these examples, one might correctly infer that for a number of
years most public service corporations have been restricted in their
use of exculpatory clauses; however, hospitals, which are also public
service corporations, were permitted to make use of the clauses
freely until 1963 when the California Supreme Court abolished their
use by hospitals in that state in Tunkl v. The Regents of the Uni8
versity of California.1
Six years later the influence of the California decision reached Kentucky when in the instant case, the Kentucky Court of Appeals cited
Tunkl and used its twin concepts of public interest and equal footing
to strike down the exculpatory clause. Unfortunately, the Kentucky
Court did not analyze the facts and concepts together in its written
opinion; rather the Court merely stated' 9 the rule and held that it
applied. 20 Although the Court's opinion lacked a discussion of the rule,
it is a logical deduction that the Court probably applied the TunkI
approach 2' of setting forth an outline of six required characteristics
before an exculpatory clause could be disallowed.
The first of these characteristics is that the business concerned must
be of a type generally thought suitable for public regulation. 22 Second,
13 F. A. Straus & Co. v. Canadian P. R.R., 254 N.Y. 407, 173 N.E. 564
(1930).4
15 Fowler v.Western U. Tel. Co., 80 Me.381, 15 A. 29 (1888).
1 Evergreen Farm v.Attalia Land Co., 91 Wash. 192, 157 P.487 (1916).
16 Housing Authority v. Morris, 244 Ala. 557, 14 So.2d 527 (1943).
7
1 Annot., 175 A.L.R. 8, 78 (1947). This view is supported by the fact that

banks and their customers generally deal on an equal footing. Contra, Hiroshima
v. Bank of Italy, 78 Cal. App. 362, 248 P. 947 (1926).
18 60 Cal.2d 92, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33, 383 P.2d 441 (1963).

19 The Court said:
The annotation points out that the decisions recognize that in some instances such an agreement may be valid, but that in no event can such

an exculpatory agreement be upheld where either: "(1) the interest of
the public requires the performance of such duties, or (2) because the
parties do not stand upon a footing of equality, the weaker party is com-

pelled to submit to the stipulation." Meiman v. Rehabilitation Center, Inc.

(Ky. Court of Appeals, May 30, 1969 at 6).
"In our view, the case at bar is one in which it is clearly against public

20

policy for the Center to seek refuge in the exculpatory agreement." Id.
21

The California Court had said that:

No definition of the concept of public interest can be conthned within
the four corners of a formula. The concept, always the subject of great
debate, has ranged over the whole course of the common law; rather than
attempt to prescribe its nature, we can only designate the situ-tions in
which it has been applied. 60 Cal. 2d 92,-, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33, 36, 383

P.2d 441, 444 (1963).
22 See 11 S. CAL. L. REv. 296 (1938).
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the party seeking exculpation must be engaged in performing a service
of great importance to the public. 23 Third, the party must hold himself out as willing to perform the service for any member of the
public who seeks it, or at least for any member coming within
certain established standards.2 4 Fourth, the exculpating party must possess a decisive advantage in bargaining strength. 25 The exculpating
party also must face the public with a standardized adhesion contract 26 and make no provision whereby a purchaser may pay ad2
ditional reasonable fees and obtain protection against negligence. 7
A final requirement is that as a result of the transaction the releasing
party has placed himself under the control of the exculpating party
28
and is subject to his carelessness.
In the present case, one can easily see how the Kentucky Court
could have mechanically found all of the above characteristics. First,
because of the nature of the treatment and the ailing conditions of
incoming patients, it is justifiable that a medical center should be

regulated in order to benefit its patients and the public.29 For the same
reasons, it is apparent that the operation of a center is of great importance to the public.80 Next, although the Center did not hold itself
out to the general public, it did satisfy the third characteristic by
holding itself out to members of the public who could meet the
standards of examination.3 ' In order to satisfy the fourth requirement,
one could assume that a person who is in need of medical services is at
a decisive bargining disadvantage. 32 Fifth, the contract was obviously
an adhesion contract which was standardized for all the incoming
23 See New York C. Ry. v.Lockwood 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 357 (1873);
Arterburn, The Origin and First Test of Public Callings, 75 U. PA. L. REv. 411
(1927).
24 See Burdick, The Origin of the Peculiar Duties of Public Service Companies, 11 CoLum. L. Rv. 514, 616, 743 (1911).
25 See Note, The Significance of Comparative Bargaining Power in the Law
of Exculpation, 37 COLum. L. B1v. 248 (1937); 20 CoRN. L.Q. 352 (1935);
19 S. CAY.. L. Rav. 441 (1946). This principle of equal bargaining is today
considered a separate test.
26 See Simmons v. Columbus Venetian Stevens Bldg., 20 Ill.
App. 2d 1, 155
N.E.2d
27 372 (1958).
See 6A A. Cottom, CoNTRAcrs § 1472 (1962). This provision does apply
to the instant case but is more important in a commercial setting.
28 See Franklin v. Southern Pacific Co., 203 Cal. 680, 265 P. 936 (1928).
29 See 11 S.CA.. L. R v., supra note 22. See also 175 A.L.R., supra note
17, at 38.
30
81

See 75 U. PA. L. REv., supra note 23.
See 11 COLum. L.

357 (1962).

REv.,

supra note 24. See also 28

BRooKLYN
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32See citations and discussion, supra note 25. See also Note, Contractual
Limitations of Negligence Liability, 8 U. FLA. L. BEy. 109 (1955); Note,
Exculpatory Clauses In Leases of Realty In Pennsylvania, 15 U. Prrr. L. Rav. 493

(1954).
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patients at the Center.3 3 It is highly unlikely that this particular contract was drawn especially for the plaintiff. Finally, since the patient
was flat on her back and being held in place by two employees at
the time of the injury, it is certain that she was completely under the
therapy was being administered and
control of the Center when the
34
was subject to its negligence.
After applying this outline of characteristics to the instant case,
it is not difficult to see how the Kentucky Court could reach its decision
by using the public interest test. Since liability has recently been extended to both hospitals and surgeons,3 5 in spite of exculpatory agreements, it follows that a private health center should be next. In light
of this, the Court could have decided this case correctly on the public
interest test alone; however, it went further and based its decision on
the concept of equal bargaining but that test does not seem to support this decision.
The equal bargaining or equal footing test provides that if the
parties dealt with one another on an equal basis, then the exculpatory
clause is valid.30 At one time this factor was considered part of the
public interest test,37 however, today it has evolved into a separate
test because the public interest test was so ambiguous that a new test
was needed to supplement it.38 Its proponents felt that it protected
public policy, like the public interest test, and furthermore protected
freedom of contract and security of transactions. 39 In applying the
test, several factors need to be considered. The first of these factors
is that there must be mutual assent and complete knowledge of the
exculpatory clause. 40 The second factor is the relative degree of
equality in bargaining strength. 41 Therefore, the more even the
bargaining strength the better the chances of the clauses being allowed.
Third, the importance of the subject matter of the contract to the
releasing party is relevant.42 Finally, the freedom of choice that the
releasing party had in dealing with the exculpating party is im33 See 20 Ill.2d 1, 155 N.E.2d 372 (1958). See also Irish & Swartz Store v.
First 3Nat. Bank of Eugene, 220 Ore. 362, 349 P.2d 814 (1960).
4 See Franklin v. Southern Pacific Co., 203 Cal. 680, 265 P. 936 (1928).
3
5 Belshaw v. Feinstein, 258 Cal. App. 2d-, 65 Cal. Rptr. 788 (1968).
3
6 See citations and discussion, supra note 26.
37 Id.
38 175 A.L.R., supra note 18, at 15. See also 6 S. WmiLSTON, CoNtAcrs §
1751 (rev. ed. 1936).
39 175 A.L.R., supra note 18, at 15.
40 Agricultural Ins. Co. v. Constantine, 144 Ohio St. 275, 58 N.E.2d 658
(1944); RESTATEMENT, CoNTua~rs § 70 (1932).
41 175 A.L.R., supra note 18, at 16.
42 Id. at 17.
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portant. 43 Thus, contracts with monopolies would probably be disallowed more often than contracts with competitive contractors.
Underlying these factors are policy arguments both for and against
allowing the exculpating party to limit his liability under the equal
footing test. The opponents of the exemption feel that tort duties are
superior to contract duties because society has a greater need to be
protected from torts than from breaches of contract. 44 As a second
argument, they say that any duty imposed by law is not valid consideration and thus the exculpatory clause must fail.4r Lastly, they feel
that big business both expects and plans for certain losses and can
easily distribute them to the public.46 The single policy argument advanced by the proponents of exemption is that exculpatory agree47
ments prevent false claims against businessmen.
In the Meiman case, several questions should have been asked
before the Court condemned the clause under the equal bargaining
test. First, were there any other institutions to which the plaintiff
49
could have gone?48 Did she know about and understand the clause?
How urgent was her need to receive these services?50 Any answer to
these questions here would be speculation because the facts do not
appear in the case 5 ' and the questions were not considered by
the Court. It would seem, however, that until these questions are
answered, the Court of Appeals has gone too far in extending the
equal footing test in Kentucky.
In conclusion, two observations seem apposite. First, since the
equal footing test was developed to be used as a supplementary test
in cases where the public interest test was not wholly satisfied, it is
probably not essential that the equal footing test be satisfied in the
Id.
Comment 44 CAL. L. REv. 120 (1956). The actor stated:
Where public safety has been involved, the courts on occasion have
declarect that the exemption contract was invalid because of the existence
of a duty in tort over and above the contractual obligation. Tort duties
are imposed by law to protect the interest of society in freedom from
various kinds of harm. They are grounded basically upon social policy
and not upon the will or intention of the parties. Id. at 127.
See also W. PnossER, TORTS 478 (2d ed. 1955).
45 1 S. WMLISTON, CoNTRACTs § 132 (rev. ed. 1936).
4 "The large business concern is better able to bear such losses and can
distribute the loss through prices, rates, or liability insurance." 44 CAL. L. REv.,
supra note 44, at 128-29.
47 Id.at 128.
48
See 175 A.L.R., supra note 18.
49 144 Ohio St. 275, 58 N.E.2d 658 (1944). See also Dodge v. Nashville,
C. & St. Ry., 142 Tenn. 20, 215 S.W. 274 (1919).
50 See 175 A.L.R., supra note 18.
51 See discussion supra note 2. In the exculpatory clause there was language
to the effect the contract bad been explained to Mrs. Meiman. This is probably a
"boilerplate" statement and does not shed light on the issue of mutual assent.
43
44
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present case. For a number of years the public interest test was the
exclusive basis for decision, and today if that test is completely
satisfied there seems to be no reason that it can not be the sole basis
of decision in Meiman. In light of this observation, it is extremely
doubtful that the Meiman decision, although ineptly articulated in
places, will ever return to haunt the Court.
Secondly, it appears that this decision, in spite of its lack of legal
exactness, is perhaps farsighted. In recent legal history many areas of
the lav have evolved to a point where the protection of the individual
is the primary concern. For example, in criminal law the rights of the
defendant have been greatly magnified under the fifth and seventh
amendments and in tort law the rights of the unborn are beginning to
be realized. Therefore, it is not surprising that this legal development
has progressed to exculpatory agreements used by the medical profession. However, this is not a case of change for change's sake. There
are several sound reasons for holding medical centers, hospitals and
doctors liabile for their torts in spite of their exculpatory agreements.
The first of these reasons is that the party who realizes his liability
will probably be more careful in applying treatment than the exculpated party. Second, employers will be more careful in selecting
their employees if they realize their liability under respondeat
superior. Finally, while the cost of an injury would be a tremendous
expense for the individual patient, the insurance carrier of the hospital
or the hospital itself could more effectively absorb and spread the cost.
In light of these two observations one may suspect that the Kentucky Court of Appeals has heard the jury charge by a mountain
judge, "Do right;" for, the Court seems to have done right even
though it stuttered in doing so.
Bruce Montgomery Reynolds
INCOmE TAXATION-ScHOLARSHIP AND FELLOWSHIP GxANTsOF TnxAstmY REGuATiN.-Westinghouse Electric Corporation offered a program of financial assistance to employees of their
FEDERAL
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Bettis Atomic Power Laboratory. That program, consisting of two
phases, was designed to attract new employees seeking to further their

education and to give advanced training to employees of Bettis in
engineering, physics, or mathematics. During the initial phase, the
employee would pursue a course of study at a local university on
company time. The company would pay tuition as well as other incidental expenses.
When all preliminary work for the doctoral degree had been
completed, the employee could opt for the final phase, for which an

